Editor’s Note: Continued from Operation ‘Aure’: The Northern Military Counter-Rebellion of July 1966 (III). In this part, we bring to you how the counter coup the coup unfolded in Lagos on Saturday July 30, 1966.
Lagos, Saturday July 30, 1966
At about 0600 hrs., Capt. JN Garba was ordered back to Police HQ. Over the course of that day, he made three trips back and forth to Ikeja on behalf of Brigadier Ogundipe, including one trip in which his vehicle was even shot at by northern troops. Emotional demands were made back and forth, including initial declarations that they no longer wanted to share barracks with Igbo soldiers, and demands that either the North be allowed to secede or that the Unification Decree be repealed with a return to the position before January 15 under a civilian government. As John de St. Jorre put it, “It was the northern soldiers, roaming around outside the conference room in their dark, satanic mood, who were the ultimate arbiters of power.”
It was during this back-and-forth ado that Gowon is said to have been pressurized by the soldiers at Ikeja to participate in the discussions and lead them as the senior northern officer. This may have been assisted by calls from Kaduna and Kano by Lt. Cols Hassan Katsina and Mohammed Shuwa. Having been alerted overnight of goings on, Ojukwu had now joined the chorus of phone calls and signals coming in from other parts of the country seeking clarification. He was even able to speak to Lt. Col. Gowon at Ikeja. It is said that Gowon told him that he was no longer a “free agent.” Ojukwu encouraged Ogundipe to keep fighting even though he himself at one point escaped from Enugu to Onitsha from where he was calling Ogundipe. Angry about the phone calls from Ojukwu, Lt. Col. Muhammed began making plans to march on Enugu – from which he was eventually restrained.
Another authority (Kirk-Greene) claims that Gowon’s change of status from government messenger to rebel representative occurred when Ogundipe declared that he could not accept the proposals being put forward by northern soldiers and wanted to remove himself from the negotiation seeing as he could not exert his authority over them. Indeed, Captain Alfred Gom had bluntly told him that they no longer wanted to deal with him or the SHQ at all. More recently, Gowon has revealed that the main grouse the mutinous soldiers at Ikeja had against dealing with and accepting orders from Ogundipe was that he had sent two separate assault teams to attack them. General Olusegun Obasanjo, however, thinks an additional reason was that Ogundipe “did not belong.” According to Biafran propaganda, a northern flag was even flown at this point over the Ikeja Barracks, but no other independent source, local or foreign has ever confirmed this allegation.
Meanwhile Lt. DS Abubakar of the 2 Recce Squadron Abeokuta and his troops of Ferrets were ordered from Lagos to Ikeja Barracks. But he was first ordered to secure Carter Bridge which was when he told the notorious Sergeant Lapdam to man the checkpoint while he left for Ikeja. Lapdam later shot Major Ibanga Ekanem, Provost Marshall, who was on his way to SHQ, allegedly with a list of northern officers who were behind the revolt. [As a Captain, Ekanem survived injuries sustained in combat as an officer in the 4QNR in Katanga during Congo Operations in 1961]. Quite a few other soldiers (and possibly civilians) were also killed on Carter Bridge and at least two southern AirForce officers later rescued from him. When Lt. DS Abubakar got to Ikeja, as reported in the Army’s official history, Col. DS Abubakar (rtd) recalls that one of those who was most strident about separation was Lt. Nuhu Nathan who reportedly told Gowon: “Let us all leave now – we all go back if we cannot form a confederation.” Gowon replied: What is that word you mentioned?”
Nathan said “Confederation,” to which Gowon retorted: “What does that mean?” As Nathan proceeded to explain, Lt. Malami Nassarawa said “I have an encyclopedia.” DS Abubakar explains that “They brought an encyclopedia, and Gowon saw the meaning of confederation in it. He was about to buy the idea – thank GOD the British High Commissioner and some of the permanent secretaries advised against it.” DS Abubakar says the British High Commissioner said: ‘If you dare do this kind of thing – confederation – that is the end of you.’ So that is why we came back to federalism.”
Others who were present include Lt. Col. Murtala Muhammed, Major Shittu Alao and Captain Baba Usman.
While Captain Garba was away on his second visit to Ikeja, Federal Permanent Secretaries met with Brigadier Ogundipe at the Police HQ. He told them that the soldiers at Ikeja were not willing nor ready to assume responsibility for running the country at that point. On his part he was not ready to do so either unless he had both legal and military backing. Although he had suspicions that Ironsi was already dead, he was not absolutely certain. To compound Ogundipe’s position, the Attorney General, GC Onyiuke advised him that there was no provision for an acting Supreme Commander in the Constitution, as amended by Decree No. 1 of 1966. Having rendered this advice, Onyiuke left Ogundipe at the Police HQ and then proceeded to depart Lagos for safety. Others did too, abandoning him and Wey there with no clear answers.
During Garba’s third visit to the Ikeja Barracks he was accompanied by the delegation of senior civil servants including Musa Daggash, Abdul Aziz Attah, HA Ejueyitchie, Yusuf Gobir, BN Okagbue, Ibrahim Damcida, Allison Ayida, Phillip Asiodu, along with Justice Adetokunbo Ademola, acting Police IG Kam Salem, Sule Katagum, Muktar Tahir, Justice Mohammed Bello, and Ali Akilu. When Garba arrived at Ikeja with them, he confirms that Muhammed was the “leading personality” in the room, doing most of the talking until he suddenly turned to Gowon and said: “You are the senior, go ahead.” This acquiescence may have been influenced by other senior northern officers as noted previously, citing seniority. DS Abubakar recalls that there was certainly an argument about who should take over and Major Abba Kyari was even briefly mentioned. However, after Gowon took over the discussions, Muhammed kept interrupting until Gowon had to turn to Muhammed and say: “Look, it’s either you have deferred to me and will allow me carry on this discussion, or you have not, and you can continue.” Garba pointedly recalls that Allison Ayida, permanent Secretary for economic development, forcefully insisted that Nigeria not be broken up and kept repeating this view “despite the fact that Murtala was far from receptive to such a view; instead he was constantly telling Ayida, his eyes red with rage, in effect to shut up.”
After complex informal negotiations brokered by Lt. Col. David Ejoor, Military Governor of the Midwest, involving Commodore Wey and Lt. Col Hassan Katsina, Gowon was finally quietly sworn in late that day, Saturday July 30, 1966, at Ikeja but he did not make an announcement to the nation until Monday August 1st. He spent the time notifying senior Police officers like Kam Salem and Hamman Maiduguri, getting information and consolidating his ‘control’ over other parts of the country – except, as later became apparent, the eastern region. In an interview with Elaigwu, Gowon described his emotions when he was anointed as C-in-C as follows:
“Honestly, I felt as if I was under a battle. I had a feeling of death – virtually choking me. I felt my throat go dry immediately. I was cold and yet sweating. If I could then, I would have ran away. But two things kept me on – one, a strong belief in God who had seen me through the Congo and two, a number of questions I kept asking myself – ‘Are you not a man? Are you not a soldier? What would people and history say of you…? My first objective was to restore discipline in the army and to prevent killings. I called the soldiers, and as I stood on the rostrum, tears were in my eyes. I was angry and at the same time moved. I told myself that if I cried, the soldiers would have had me. I took courage and addressed them. I told them that if I heard of any more killing, they should also remember that I was a soldier, and that I could and would, kill.”
In his speech to the nation on August 1st, Gowon said, among other things:
“This is Lt. Col. Y. Gowon, Army Chief of Staff, speaking to you…. I have been brought to the position today of having to shoulder the great responsibilities of this country and the armed forces with the consent of the majority of the members of the Supreme Military Council as a result of the unfortunate incident that occurred on the early morning of 29th July, 1966….
“As a result of the recent events and the other previous similar ones, I have come to strongly believe that we cannot honestly and sincerely continue in this wise, as the basis of trust and confidence in our unitary system has not been able to stand the test of time. I have already remarked on the issues in question. Suffice to say that, putting all considerations to test – political, economic, as well as social – the base for unity is not there or is so badly rocked, not only once but several times. I, therefore, feel that we should review the issue of our national standing and see if we can help stop the country from drifting away into utter destruction….
“All members of the armed forces are requested to keep within their barracks except on essential duties and when ordered from SHQ. Troops must not terrorize the public, as such action will discredit the new National Military Government….
“I promise you that I shall do all I can to return to civil rule as soon as it can be arranged. I also intend to pursue most vigorously the question of the release of political prisoners. Fellow countrymen, give me your support and I shall endeavor to live up to expectations. Thank you.”
Shortly thereafter, on the same day, Lt. Col. Ojukwu, Military Governor of the East, made a counter-broadcast from Enugu. The next morning Gowon signed an instrument of pardon for Chief Obafemi Awolowo, Chief Anthony Enahoro, and others who had been convicted and jailed in September 1963 for treasonable felony, conspiracy to commit a felony and conspiracy to effect an unlawful purpose in 1962 with the object of forcefully removing Alhaji Tafawa Balewa from office as Prime Minister.
On August 3rd, Lt. Col. David Ejoor made a public speech as the Military Governor of the Midwest, in support of the new regime. Likewise, on August 4, Colonel Adeyinka Adebayo, Military Governor of the West, broadcast his support for the new government as Gowon was addressing a press conference at the Lagos City Hall, having earlier that day released Isaac Boro and others. Gowon was later to announce his plans for return to civilian rule four days later, followed the next day by a meeting of delegates representing the Regional Military Governors.
However, Gowon or no Gowon, northern NCOs were still running amok killing people arbitrarily, even threatening northern officers who stood in their way. Lt. DS Abubakar was very nearly shot at Ikeja airport in this manner by one Edward William allegedly for “hiding some Igbo people.” Lagos Garrison Commander, Lt. Col. Eze, barely escaped a mob of northern soldiers on August 2nd but his staff officer, Captain Iloputaife, was not so lucky. Indeed, a few days after the mutiny, a northern corporal at Ikeja summarized his own motives for the mutiny by telling Norman Miners: “The Ibos killed our leaders in January; they were taking all the top jobs; we had to get rid of them. Now we have only got Northerners in this barracks; all the Southerners have run away.” In fact, northern NCOs and soldiers were in the habit of taking uniforms of dead Igbo officers and NCOs and wearing their ranks. On August 8, all Igbo soldiers at the Army workshop in Yaba were expelled. But as the nation was to find out, the worst was yet to come. Colonel DS Abubakar (rtd) recalls:
“At that time, if an other-rank does not like the face of another person he will just kill him like an animal and nobody will do anything.”
But it would be simplistic to presume that some northern officers did not take part in the killings in Lagos. Lt. Nuhu Nathan, for example, was later personally credited in eastern publications with the execution of some Igbo soldiers at Ikeja. There were undoubtedly others.
To Continue in Part V: The Happenings in Kaduna.
